![]() This should be verified by looking at the contents of the ClientHello and ServerHello messages. If your trace shows no Certificate message from the client, then this would mean that you are using SSL-3.0, which, as of August 2015, is weird (clients and servers should know TLS-1.0 by now). This is what is supposed to happen with TLS-1.0 and later versions in SSL-3.0, a client with no suitable certificate would omit the Certificate message altogether, and instead send an alert message of level "warning" and type "no_certificate" (numerical value: 41). In any case, if the server requests a client certificate (with a CertificateRequest message), and the client has no suitable certificate, then the client behaviour should be to send an empty Certificate message ( before its ClientKeyExchange). Maybe your network trace conflates the traffic from several TLS connections, and the "encrypted alert" pertains to another, older handshake (it could be the close_notify alert that marks the end of the previous connection). An alert record consists in a sequence of "alerts", each of them consisting in a couple of bytes: first byte specifies the alert level (1 = warning, 2 = fatal), second byte documents the nature of the alert. Perhaps the "encrypted" alert message is not encrypted. Thus, from the client, it would make no sense to send an encrypted alert before the ClientKeyExchange (that is, not only doing encryption before the Finished messages would violate the standard, but doing so before the ClientKeyExchange would also break the Laws of Nature). ![]() If the message is encrypted, then it is meant to be decrypted on the other side since the symmetric encryption keys are derived from the "master secret" which itself comes from the agreed-upon key exchange mechanism, the receiving end (here, the server) cannot logically decrypt a record before the completion of the key exchange. p12 keystore: openssl pkcs12 -in proxyserver.p12 -nocerts -out encrypted.key -password pass:mc3VZAuZvgYzt6pIQq3w -passout pass:mc3VZAuZvgYzt6pIQq3wĪnd finally decrypt the private key for later use in Wireshark: openssl rsa -in encrypted.key -out decrypted.In TLS there cannot be an encrypted record before the first handshake is completed the first encrypted record sent by either the client or the server is a Finished message. Next you can extract encrypted RSA private key from the. keytool command keytool -importkeystore -srckeystore proxyserver.jks -destkeystore proxyserver.p12 -srcstoretype JKS -deststoretype PKCS12 -srcstorepass mc3VZAuZvgYzt6pIQq3w -deststorepass mc3VZAuZvgYzt6pIQq3w Then you need to convert JKS keystore to PKCS12 via i.e. If you cannot obtain the RSA private key from the website you're testing you can still attempt to obtain it using JMeter's HTTP(S) Test Script Recorder you need to first generate a MITM proxy keystore and make JMeter aware of this keystore by modifying the following JMeter Properties: =proxyserver.jks Once done you should be able to decrypt the outgoing requests using Wireshark. ![]() Once done you need to configure protocol dissector using the aforementioned private key in Wireshark - Preferences - Protocols - TLS JMeter knows nothing about this SSLKEYLOGFILE environment variable, if you want to capture encrypted traffic originating from JMeter via Wireshark you will need to go for RSA key approachįirst you need to get the private key from the website you're testing.
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